Fugitive Located by Spotify

https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2015/07/fugitive_locate.html

The latest in identification by data:

Webber said a tipster had spotted recent activity from Nunn on the Spotify streaming service and alerted law enforcement. He scoured the Internet for other evidence of Nunn and Barr's movements, eventually filling out 12 search warrants for records at different technology companies. Those searches led him to an IP address that traced Nunn to Cabo San Lucas, Webber said.

Nunn, he said, had been avidly streaming television shows and children's programs on various online services, giving the sheriff's department a hint to the couple's location.

Bizarre High-Tech Kidnapping

https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2015/07/bizarre_high-te.html

This is a story of a very high-tech kidnapping:

FBI court filings unsealed last week showed how Denise Huskins' kidnappers used anonymous remailers, image sharing sites, Tor, and other people's Wi-Fi to communicate with the police and the media, scrupulously scrubbing meta data from photos before sending. They tried to use computer spyware and a DropCam to monitor the aftermath of the abduction and had a Parrot radio-controlled drone standing by to pick up the ransom by remote control.

The story also demonstrates just how effective the FBI is tracing cell phone usage these days. They had a blocked call from the kidnappers to the victim's cell phone. First they used an search warrant to AT&T to get the actual calling number. After learning that it was an AT&T prepaid Trakfone, they called AT&T to find out where the burner was bought, what the serial numbers were, and the location where the calls were made from.

The FBI reached out to Tracfone, which was able to tell the agents that the phone was purchased from a Target store in Pleasant Hill on March 2 at 5:39 pm. Target provided the bureau with a surveillance-cam photo of the buyer: a white male with dark hair and medium build. AT&T turned over records showing the phone had been used within 650 feet of a cell site in South Lake Tahoe.

Here's the criminal complaint. It borders on surreal. Were it an episode of CSI:Cyber, you would never believe it.

New RC4 Attack

https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2015/07/new_rc4_attack_1.html

New research: "All Your Biases Belong To Us: Breaking RC4 in WPA-TKIP and TLS," by Mathy Vanhoef and Frank Piessens:

Abstract: We present new biases in RC4, break the Wi-Fi Protected Access Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (WPA-TKIP), and design a practical plaintext recovery attack against the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. To empirically find new biases in the RC4 keystream we use statistical hypothesis tests. This reveals many new biases in the initial keystream bytes, as well as several new long-term biases. Our fixed-plaintext recovery algorithms are capable of using multiple types of biases, and return a list of plaintext candidates in decreasing likelihood.

To break WPA-TKIP we introduce a method to generate a large number of identical packets. This packet is decrypted by generating its plaintext candidate list, and using redundant packet structure to prune bad candidates. From the decrypted packet we derive the TKIP MIC key, which can be used to inject and decrypt packets. In practice the attack can be executed within an hour. We also attack TLS as used by HTTPS, where we show how to decrypt a secure cookie with a success rate of 94% using 9*227 ciphertexts. This is done by injecting known data around the cookie, abusing this using Mantin's ABSAB bias, and brute-forcing the cookie by traversing the plaintext candidates. Using our traffic generation technique, we are able to execute the attack in merely 75 hours.

News articles.

We need to deprecate the algorithm already.

Stagefright Vulnerability in Android Phones

https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2015/07/stagefright_vul.html

The Stagefright vulnerability for Android phones is a bad one. It's exploitable via a text message (details depend on auto downloading of the particular phone), it runs at an elevated privilege (again, the severity depends on the particular phone -- on some phones it's full privilege), and it's trivial to weaponize. Imagine a worm that infects a phone and then immediately sends a copy of itself to everyone on that phone's contact list.

The worst part of this is that it's an Android exploit, so most phones won't be patched anytime soon -- if ever. (The people who discovered the bug alerted Google in April. Google has sent patches to its phone manufacturer partners, but most of them have not sent the patch to Android phone users.)

Hacking Team's Purchasing of Zero-Day Vulnerabilities

https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2015/07/hacking_teams_p.html

This is an interesting article that looks at Hacking Team's purchasing of zero-day (0day) vulnerabilities from a variety of sources:

Hacking Team's relationships with 0day vendors date back to 2009 when they were still transitioning from their information security consultancy roots to becoming a surveillance business. They excitedly purchased exploit packs from D2Sec and VUPEN, but they didn't find the high-quality client-side oriented exploits they were looking for. Their relationship with VUPEN continued to frustrate them for years. Towards the end of 2012, CitizenLab released their first report on Hacking Team's software being used to repress activists in the United Arab Emirates. However, a continuing stream of negative reports about the use of Hacking Team's software did not materially impact their relationships. In fact, by raising their profile these reports served to actually bring Hacking Team direct business. In 2013 Hacking Team's CEO stated that they had a problem finding sources of new exploits and urgently needed to find new vendors and develop in-house talent. That same year they made multiple new contacts, including Netragard, Vitaliy Toropov, Vulnerabilities Brokerage International, and Rosario Valotta. Though Hacking Team's internal capabilities did not significantly improve, they continued to develop fruitful new relationships. In 2014 they began a close partnership with Qavar Security.

Lots of details in the article. This was made possible by the organizational doxing of Hacking Team by some unknown individuals or group.

Friday Squid Blogging: How a Squid Changes Color

https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2015/07/friday_squid_bl_488.html

The California market squid, Doryteuthis opalescens, can manipulate its color in a variety of ways:

Reflectins are aptly-named proteins unique to the light-sensing tissue of cephalopods like squid. Their skin contains specialized cells called iridocytes that produce color by reflecting light in a predictable way. When the neurotransmitter acetylcholine activates reflectin proteins, this triggers the contraction and expansion of deep pleats in the cell membrane of iridocytes. By turning enzymes on and off, this process adjusts (or tunes) the brightness and color of the light that's reflected.

Interesting details in the article and the paper.

As usual, you can also use this squid post to talk about the security stories in the news that I haven't covered.

How an Amazon Worker Stole iPads

https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2015/07/how_an_amazon_w.html

A worker in Amazon's packaging department in India figured out how to deliver electronics to himself:

Since he was employed with the packaging department, he had easy access to order numbers. Using the order numbers, he packed his order himself; but instead of putting pressure cookers in the box, he stuffed it with iPhones, iPads, watches, cameras, and other expensive electronics in the pressure cooker box. Before dispatching the order, the godown also has a mechanism to weigh the package. To dodge this, Bhamble stuffed equipment of equivalent weight," an officer from Vithalwadi police station said. Bhamble confessed to the cops that he had ordered pressure cookers thrice in the last 15 days. After he placed the order, instead of, say, packing a five-kg pressure cooker, he would stuff gadgets of equivalent weight. After receiving delivery clearance, he would then deliver the goods himself and store it at his house. Speaking to mid-day, Deputy Commissioner of Police (Zone IV) Vasant Jadhav said, "Bhamble's job profile was of goods packaging at Amazon.com's warehouse in Bhiwandi.

Remotely Hacking a Car While It's Driving

https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2015/07/remotely_hackin.html

This is a big deal. Hackers can remotely hack the Uconnect system in cars just by knowing the car's IP address. They can disable the brakes, turn on the AC, blast music, and disable the transmission:

The attack tools Miller and Valasek developed can remotely trigger more than the dashboard and transmission tricks they used against me on the highway. They demonstrated as much on the same day as my traumatic experience on I-64; After narrowly averting death by semi-trailer, I managed to roll the lame Jeep down an exit ramp, re-engaged the transmission by turning the ignition off and on, and found an empty lot where I could safely continue the experiment.

Miller and Valasek's full arsenal includes functions that at lower speeds fully kill the engine, abruptly engage the brakes, or disable them altogether. The most disturbing maneuver came when they cut the Jeep's brakes, leaving me frantically pumping the pedal as the 2-ton SUV slid uncontrollably into a ditch. The researchers say they're working on perfecting their steering control -- for now they can only hijack the wheel when the Jeep is in reverse. Their hack enables surveillance too: They can track a targeted Jeep's GPS coordinates, measure its speed, and even drop pins on a map to trace its route.

In related news, there's a Senate bill to improve car security standards. Honestly, I'm not sure our security technology is enough to prevent this sort of thing if the car's controls are attached to the Internet.